Is Intent Required - Zero Tolerance, Scienter, and the Substantive Due Process Rights of Students ? by Pelliccioni, Christopher D.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 53 | Issue 4
2003
Is Intent Required - Zero Tolerance, Scienter, and
the Substantive Due Process Rights of Students ?
Christopher D. Pelliccioni
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Christopher D. Pelliccioni, Is Intent Required - Zero Tolerance, Scienter, and the Substantive Due Process Rights of Students ?, 53 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 977 (2003)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol53/iss4/14
NOTES
IS INTENT REQUIRED?
ZERO TOLERANCE, SCIENTER, AND
THE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS OF STUDENTS
"The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere
more vital than in the community of American schools."'
The emergence of zero tolerance policies in America's public
schools has generated a great deal of controversy during the past
decade. Though the creation of such policies dates back to the
passage of the Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994,2 the outrage over its
implications entered the spotlight in 1999. Hundreds of people in
Decatur, Illinois, and thousands across the nation protested the ex-
pulsion of seven high school boys for fighting at a high school
football game. 3 Ultimately, Jesse Jackson and the Rainbow Coali-
tion went to Decatur to demonstrate against these policies.4
Zero tolerance has recently come under attack by many differ-
ent organizations. At its meeting in February 2001, the American
Bar Association approved a resolution opposing zero tolerance
policies in schools, expressing concern about regulations that re-
quire automatic punishment without regard to circumstances.5
Groups such as the Rutherford Institute have begun to track and
fight such policies through the representation of students affected
by the imposition of zero tolerance laws.6
Why do these policies generate so much controversy? At
their inception, these regulations were heralded by the American
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
2 20 U.S.C. § 8921 (2000) (repealed 2002).'
3 See Joan M. Wasser, Zeroing In on Zero Tolerance, 15 J.L. & POL. 747 (1999).
4 See Kerry A. White, Decatur, Ill., Embroiled in Expulsion Dispute, EDUC. WK., Nov.
17, 1999, at 3.
5 ABA, RESOLUTION TO THE HOUSE DELEGATES 14 (Feb. 19, 2001), available at
htnp://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/zerotolreport.html.
6 See John Leo, Cracking Down on Kids, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 13, 1999, at
19.
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Federation of Teachers, who urged a nationwide adoption of zero
tolerance policies to curb the effects of violence in America's
schools. 7  Ultimately, the Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994 was
passed, whereby each state receiving federal funding pursuant to
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act must expel, for at
least one year, any student who possesses a weapon on school
grounds. 8 Many states have elected to go beyond the federal legis-
lation by expanding the definition of "weapon" to include knives
and other instrumentalities. 9 Though most people would seem-
ingly agree that schools should adopt tough policies to curb school
violence, the fact that many of these regulations lack a scienter
requirement has generated much debate. Many courts have strug-
gled with the constitutionality of a school policy that does not con-
sider, whether a student intended to violate a rule prohibiting pos-
session of knives, drugs, or alcohol on school grounds or at school
activities. 10
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit essentially struck down zero tolerance policies, stating in
Seal v. Morgan that "suspending or expelling a student for weap-
ons possession, even if the student did not knowingly possess any
weapon" would violate substantive due process. 1 The court ulti-
mately concluded that such policies are irrational. 12  The Sixth
Circuit is the first appellate court to expressly rule that such poli-
cies are unconstitutional; the opinions of various circuit courts of
appeal and district courts have come to mixed conclusions on the
issue. 13  Most recently, in an unpublished opinion, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld zero toler-
7 See Teachers' Union Wants to Expel Students Who Carry Guns, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,
1994, at A13.
See 20 U.S.C. § 8921 (2000) (repealed 2002); see also Laura Beresh-Taylor, Preventing
Violence in Ohio's Schools, 33 AKRON L. REV. 311, 323 (2000) (discussing the methods that
can be used by schools to prevent violence and the often conflicting rights of students).
9 Wasser, supra note 3, at 750. The federal definition defines "weapon" to include guns,
bombs, grenades, and other devices. 18 U.S.C. § 921 (1995).
'0 Beresh-Taylor, supra note 8, at 320-23; see infra Part II.
11 See Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2000). The dissent argued that the majority
created a system whereby school zero tolerance policies throughout the circuit would now need
to contain an express intent requirement, essentially destroying the essence of a zero tolerance
policy. Id at 575 (Suhreinrich, J., dissenting).
1' Id. at 578.
13 Compare id. with Ratner v. Loudoun County Pub. Sch., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 16941
(4th Cir. 2001) (finding that there was no due process violation where student was suspended
for ten days after school officials found a knife he had confiscated from his suicidal friend), cert
denied, 2002 WL 75715 (U.S.); Arthur A. v. Stroudsburg Area Sch. Dist., 141 F. Supp. 2d 502
(M.D. Pa. 2001) (finding that a student's right to due process was not violated by a ten-day
suspension for making terrorist threats); Bundick v. Bay City Indep. Sch. Dist., 140 F. Supp. 2d
735 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (holding that no due process violation existed where a student was discov-
ered to have a knife in his car on school grounds).
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ance policies, stating that "federal courts are not properly called
upon to judge the wisdom of a zero tolerance policy of the sort
alleged to be in place." 14
The question of whether zero tolerance policies violate the
substantive due process rights of students by not considering sci-
enter as an element of the offense has important implications for
school administration. School districts, confronted with inconsis-
tent court opinions, are currently lacking clear guidance on how to
constitutionally implement such policies. It is unclear whether
school districts need to include an intent requirement in any policy
that they create. This uncertainty has led to an overall evaluation
of the tools that school districts can utilize to maintain order and
safety in their schools.
Concerning the legality of zero tolerance, it is unclear whether
federal courts should be interfering with the implementation of
these policies in the first place. Considering statements from the
Supreme Court admonishing lower courts against interfering with
the operations of public schools, it is uncertain what role federal
courts should play in the adjudication of school policies. 15 It is
also unclear whether these zero tolerance policies could or should
fall within the strict liability exceptions to the criminal law neces-
sity for mens rea or "guilty mind." Though school disciplinary
decisions are not criminal matters, the use of strict liability in the
context of zero tolerance should be analyzed under this framework
because of the interests that students possess in attending public
schools. Students are not having their liberty taken from them due
to the imposition of zero tolerance, but their rights to an education
are being seriously affected. Further, courts have questioned the
use of strict liability in other areas of the law involving the depri-
vation of property interests, even though they do not involve
criminal punishment or civil fines.
This Note will explore whether scienter is constitutionally re-
quired as an element of a school's zero tolerance policy, and
whether the lack of such an intent requirement violates a student's
substantive due process rights. Part I looks at Supreme Court de-
cisions interpreting the procedural and substantive due process
rights of students. Part II examines the few cases that have ana-
lyzed whether zero tolerance policies that lack scienter violate a
student's substantive due process rights. Part III points out that
federal courts have been hesitant to interfere in public school ad-
14 Ratner, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 16941 at *2.
15 Seal, 229 F.3d at 582 (Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting) (noting that, by and large, the opera-
tion of public schools is a state matter).
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ministration, but that have the ability to do so if the school policy
is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Finally, Part
IV discusses the several areas of the law where a traditional mens
rea is not required in order for a person to be convicted of a crime,
and how zero tolerance policies do not fit within any such excep-
tion. Part IV further argues that zero tolerance policies that do not
take the student's intent into account are irrational and illegal.
I. THE PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF
STUDENTS
A History of the Court's Jurisprudence
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
does not allow states to "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property' without due process of law."' 6 This Due Process Clause
"provides heightened protection against government interference
with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests."'' 7 Due proc-
ess can be divided into procedural and substantive components.
Minimal procedural due process entitles parties whose rights have
been affected to be notified and heard. 18 Substantive due process
grants protection from arbitrary and unreasonable action.19 These
broad rights have not always been afforded to students in public
schools. The Supreme Court stated in 1943 that, "The Fourteenth
Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen[s]
against the State itself and all of its creatures - Boards of Educa-
tion not excepted., 20 These rights, though, were not truly defined
until much later.
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict, 2 the Court declared that students do not "shed their constitu-
tional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate. 22 In that case, school administrators had suspended several
students who wore black armbands to protest the Vietnam War.23
Ultimately, the Supreme Court declared that students have the
right to free expression absent a substantial disruption that would
affect the educational process or the rights of other students.2 4 Jus-
16 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,720 (1997).
18 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
19 Id. at 8 1.
20 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
21 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
22 Id. at 506.
23 Id. at 504.
24 Id. at 513-14.
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tice Fortas, on behalf of the majority, believed that "[i]n our sys-
tem, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism.
School officials do not possess absolute authority over their stu-
dents. 25 Fortas continued, "[Students] are possessed of funda-
mental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves
must respect their obligations to the State."
26
27The Court in Goss v. Lopez extended such rights to students
facing suspension.28 In Goss, nine public high school students
were suspended for ten days without a hearing. 29 The Court as-
serted that "a student's legitimate entitlement to a public education
[is] a property interest which is protected by the Due Process
Clause and may not be taken away ...without adherence to the
minimum procedure required by that Clause. ' 30 The Court con-
cluded that the minimum constitutional standards were that "stu-
dents facing suspension and the consequent interference with a
protected property interest must be given some notice and afforded
some kind of hearing., 31 Though Goss is a procedural due process
case, which is almost never an issue in zero tolerance expulsions
because students are always given some sort of notice and hearing,
the Court also asserted other interests that students possess in at-
tending public schools. Those interests include student's interest
in protecting his "name, reputation, honor, or integrity." 32 Expul-
sion or suspension from school would arguably harm a student's
reputation and name by affecting their ability to graduate from
high school. Such a disciplinary record could also possibly affect
that student's chance at gaining admission to college. One might
infer that any deprivation of a student's name, reputation, honor,
or integrity would violate that student's substantive due process
rights.
These constitutional interests were further solidified in New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 33 where the Court held that the Fourth Amend-
ment's prohibition on unreasonable searches-and seizures applied
to the conduct of school administrators. 34 This case involved a
student who was disciplined because the school principal searched
25 ld. at 511.
26 Id.
27 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
28 Id. at 568-70.
29 Id at 568.
30 Id. at 574.
31 Id. at 579.
32 Id. at 574.
33 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
34 Id. at 336-38.
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her purse and found cigarettes and marijuana. 35  The student
claimed that that the search violated her Fourth Amendment
rights.36 Though the Court was aware of the increasingly violent
nature of schools, 37 it ultimately concluded that the student's pri-
vacy concerns outweighed the fears of teachers concerned about
student violence. 38  The test the Court articulated for student
searches was an attempt to balance "the accommodation of the pri-
vacy interests of schoolchildren with the substantial need of teach-
ers and administrators for freedom to maintain order., 39 The Court
stated that "the legality of a search of a student should depend sim-
ply on the reasonableness, under the circumstances, of the
search."4'' Thus, T.L.O. backed away from the traditional "prob-
able cause" requirement for searches of individuals,4 1 yet still
granted students protection from school administrators by mandat-
ing that any search of a student needs to be reasonable.
The constitutional rights of students granted in Tinker and
T.L.O. 42 seemed to have been slightly diminished in Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier,43 where the Court held that schools
could exercise control over the style and content of student speech
in school-sponsored activities such as a school newspaper.44 The
majority explained that this standard would be consistent with the
Court's "oft-expressed view that the education of the Nation's
youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state
and local officials, and not of federal judges. 45 One might infer
that in the wake of Hazelwood, student's rights within public
schools could be further diminished from the broad rights granted
under Tinker and Goss. But, of course, the implications for zero
tolerance policies remain unresolved.
B. The Court's Standard of Review
In general, a government action that burdens the exercise of
fundamental rights or liberty interests or that involves suspect clas-
35 Id. at 328.
36 Id. at 332-33.
37 Id. at 339 (stating that school disorder has "taken particularly ugly forms" such as drug
use a violent crime).
38 Id. at 337-42.
39 Id. at 341.
40 Id.
41 See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 143 (1990); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
42 See Wasser, supra note 3, at 757 (discussing that free speech is allowed unless it causes
a "substantial disruption" or interferes with other's rights).
43 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
44 Id. at 273.
45 Id.
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IS INTENT REQUIRED?
classifications is subject to strict scrutiny, and will be upheld only
if the action serves a compelling governmental interest and is nar-
rowly tailored to achieve that interest. 46 Examples of fundamental
rights include the right to marry, the right to have children, and the
right to bodily integrity. 47 The right to attend public schools, how-
ever, is not considered a fundamental right.48 Government actions
that do not affect fundamental rights or liberty interests, such as
actions interfering with public school attendance, will be upheld
under a lesser standard of review. Such actions will be found con-
stitutionally valid if they are considered to be rationally related to
a legitimate interest.
49
Since the right to attend public school is not considered a fun-
damental right, administrator's actions against a student's interest
in attending school must be rationally related to a legitimate state
interest. 50 In general, in the context of school discipline, punish-
ment does not implicate substantive due process unless the action
is "arbitrary, capricious, or wholly unrelated to the legitimate state
goal of maintaining an atmosphere conducive to learning."5' The
majority and dissent in one case agreed that this rational basis test
was the correct method of review for determining the constitu-
tional nature of zero tolerance policies.52
II. ZERO TOLERANCE CASES
A. Seal v. Morgan
The most important case holding that zero tolerance policies,
which lack a scienter requirement, violate a student's substantive
due process rights is Seal v. Morgan.53 Dustin Seal attended Pow-
ell High School in Knox County, Tennessee, during the 1996
school year.54 Ray Pritchert, a friend of Seal's, was also a student
at Powell High School.55 Pritchert became involved in an ongoing
46 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
47 Id.
48 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 32-38 (1973).
49 Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997).
50 Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 574-75 (6th Cir. 2000).
51 Jefferson v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 303, 305-06 (5th Cir. 1987).
52 See Seal, 229 F.3d at 575, 582. The reasoning and facts of this case are further dis-
cussed in Part ll.A. of this Note.
53 229 F.3d 567.
54 Benjamin Dowling-Sendor, What Did He Know and When Did He Know It? A Circuit
Court Rules That Students Can't Be Disciplined For Offenses They Don't Know About, AM.
SCH. BD. J., Mar. 2001. at 23.
5 See Seal, 229 F.3d at 570-71.
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dispute with another student who began dating his ex-girlfriend.56
As a result of this dispute, Pritchert began carrying a hunting knife
around the school.57 Ultimately, the knife was placed into the
glove box of Seal's mother's car, apparently without Seal's knowl-
edge.58
Seal was caught with that knife at a football game at school
the next day.59 After a teacher asked Pritchert and Seal if they had
been drinking, the two were asked to talk with the vice-principal.
After the vice-principal unsuccessfully searched both Seal and
Pritchert for alcohol, he searched Seal's car for a flask. The vice-
principal found two cigarettes, a bottle of prescription drugs, and
Pritchert's knife in the glove compartment.6° Several days later, a
disciplinary hearing was held and Seal was expelled pursuant to
the district's zero tolerance policy for possession of a knife on
school grounds.61
Seal's father then initiated a suit on his son's behalf pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.62 Seal claimed that his expulsion violated his
rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and that the search of his mother's car
violated the Fourth Amendment.63
The majority in Seal v. Morgan held that in order for the
school district's zero tolerance policy to be constitutionally per-
missible, it must be rationally related to a legitimate state goal. 64
In other words, the policy must rationally be related to the school's
interest in maintaining a safe learning environment for its students
and faculty. The court reasoned that "suspending or expelling a
student for weapons possession, even if the student did not know-
ingly possess any weapon, would not be rationally related to any
legitimate state interest." 65
The majority based this conclusion on simple logic: a student
cannot injure another with a weapon or disrupt the operation of the
school if that student is absolutely unaware of having possession
56 Id. at 571.
57 Id.
58 Dowling-Sendor, supra note 54, at 24. (reporting that evidence later introduced during
disciplinary hearings showed that Seal knew that his friend had been carrying around a hunting
knife and that Pritchert possessed the knife the night before the two were caught).
59 Seal, 229 F.3d at 571.
60 Id. Note that Seal consented to the search of his car.
61 Id. at 572-73. The issue of whether the search of Seal's car violated his Fourth Amend-
ment rights is not central to the case nor to the issue of whether zero tolerance policies violate
the substantive due process rights of students.
62 Id. at 573 (bringing suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003)).
63 Id.
64 Id. at 575.
65 Id.
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66
of a weapon. 6The court also reasoned that the basic rules of
criminal law should apply in the case.67 In most criminal statutes a
mens rea element is necessary before one can be convicted of a
crime. The court cited several criminal cases where knowledge of
possession, or intent was necessary before a conviction could be
upheld.68 In fact, Judge Gillman concluded that this principle is
"so obvious that it would go without saying." 69
To bolster its claim, the majority posed two hypothetical
situations where innocent students could be suspended for violat-
ing the board's zero tolerance policy. The first such hypothetical
involved the school valedictorian who has a knife planted in his
backpack without his knowledge by another student and is subject
to expulsion for possessing a weapon on school grounds.70  The
second hypothetical situation involved a student who unknowingly
drinks the spiked punch at a high school dance and is subject to
suspension or expulsion for violating a school policy against
drinking at school functions. 7' The majority concluded that this
student would be subject to expulsion or suspension for unknow-
ingly drinking the punch, even if the school board was convinced
that the student was completely unaware of the presence of alcohol
in his drink.72 Thus, the court believed that suspending innocent
students who were unaware that they were carrying knives or
drinking alcohol at a school dance would not be rationally related
to a legitimate interest in protecting students.
Judge Suhrheinrich, in dissent, stressed that the Supreme
Court has cautioned federal courts against interfering in the opera-
tion of the public school system.73 He noted that the Supreme
Court in Goss v. Lopez74 expressly stated, "By and large, public
education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and
local authorities. 7 5 In fact, Suhrheinrich reiterated the majority's
concession that a substantive due process claim would succeed
66 Id. at 575-76.
67 Id. at 576-77.
68 See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 701 F.2d 972 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that to obtain
a conviction for constructive possession of a firearm, the government has the burden of showing
that the possession was knowing); see also State v. Rice, 374 A.2d 128 (Conn. 1976) (conclud-
ing that knowing possession was required).
69 Seal, 229 F.3d at 576.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 578.
72 Id.
73 See id. at 582 (Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting) (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578
(1975)).
- 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
75 Id. at 578 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
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only in the rare case where there is no rational relationship be-
tween the punishment and the offense.76
Judge Suhrheinnrich's opinion argued that the board of educa-
tion's decision was rational even though the zero tolerance policy
in place in Knox County did not contain an express scienter re-
quirement.77 Thus, Dustin Seal's intent to carry the weapon was
not required. Suhrheinrich believed that the majority was wrong in
stating that the omission of a scienter requirement was irrational
because the court had substituted its interpretation of the regula-
tion for that of the school board's. According.to the dissent, the
board's interpretation of its regulations is entitled to deference.78
Judge Suhreinrich also argued that a strict weapons policy is ra-
tionally related to the state's interest in protecting students, em-
phasizing the real threat of school violence.79
B. Ratner v. Loudoun County Public Schools
Less than a year after the Sixth Circuit decided Seal v. Mor-
gan, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reached the opposite conclusion in Ratner v. Loudoun County Pub-
lic Schools.80 In that case, decided by unpublished opinion, the
court determined that there were no substantive due process viola-
tions and that the district's zero tolerance policy was constitution-
ally permissible.8 1 On January 22, 2002, the United States Su-
preme Court refused to grant certiorari to Ratner.82
In October 1999, Benjamin Ratner was an eighth grader at
Blue Ridge Middle School in Loudoun County, Virginia. 83  A
schoolmate told him that she had been suicidal and was contem-
plating killing herself. She told Ratner that she had brought a
knife to school in her binder. Taking the threat seriously, he took
the binder from her and put it in his locker.84
After hearing about the situation, Fanny Kellogg, the school
dean, called Ratner into her office and asked him to retrieve the
binder that contained the knife that he had confiscated from his
friend.85 Ratner was then suspended for ten days for possessing a
76 Seal, 229 F.3d at 575, 582 (Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting) (citing Rosa R. v. Connelly,
889 F.2d 435, 439 (2nd Cir. 1989)).
77 Id. at 582 (Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting).
78 Id. (Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting).
79 Id. (Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting).
80 No. 00-2157, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 16941, at *1 (4th Cir. July 30, 2001) (per curiam).
'1 Id. at *6.
82 Ratner v. Loudoun County Pub. Sch., 534 U.S. 1114 (2002).
83 Ratner, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 16941, at *1.
84 Id. at *1-2.
85 Id. at *2.
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knife on school grounds in violation of the school's zero tolerance
policy. 86 After a hearing, Ratner was suspended for the rest of the
term even though Kellogg acknowledged that she thought that
Ratner acted in the girl's best interest and did not pose a threat to
87
anyone in the school. Ratner sued claiming that the school
board's zero tolerance policy violated his substantive due process
rights.88
The Fourth Circuit held that "[h]owever harsh the results in
this case, the federal courts are not properly called upon to judge
the wisdom of [the] zero tolerance policy" that was in place at the
middle school. 89 The majority stated that their primary inquiry in
the case was "limited to whether Ratner's complaint alleges suffi-
cient facts which if proved would show that the implementation of
the school's policy in this case failed to comport with the United
States Constitution." 90 Ultimately, the court concluded that the
facts alleged in the case did not demonstrate a constitutional viola-
tion.91
Judge Hamilton, in a concurring opinion, expressed sympathy
for Ratner, but concluded that the zero tolerance policy did not
violate Ratner's substantive due process rights. 92 Judge Hamilton
stated that Ratner's suspension from school was not justifiable,
and was "calculated overkill" but thought that the school had the
best intentions in trying to maintain a safe school environment.
However, while referring to the school's zero tolerance policy,
Hamilton felt that "'the road to hell is paved with good intentions.'
The panic over school violence and the intent to stop it has caused
school officials to jettison the common sense idea that a person's
punishment should fit his crime in favor of ... mandatory school
suspension. 93
C. Bundick v. Bay City Independent School District
Bundick v. Bay City Independent School District,94 much like
Seal v. Morgan, began with the discovery of a knife in a student's
car, yet the court in Bundick reached a drastically different result.
On March 9, 1998, a police dog at Bay City High School smelled
86 Id. at *3.
87 Id.
88 Id. at *3-4.
89 Id. at *6.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at *7 (Hamilton, J., concurring).
93 Id. at *8 (Hamilton, J., concurring).
94 140 F. Supp. 2d 735 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
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something that alerted it to David Bundick's truck, which was
parked in the school lot.95 The dog's suspicion was reasonable
grounds to search the vehicle,96 and Bundick was summoned to
open the truck's cab and toolbox. A machete, or large knife, was
uncovered and was immediately seized pursuant to the school's
zero tolerance of weapons policy.
97
A disciplinary hearing was held, and the superintendent ex-
pelled him for the remainder of the school term. 98 Bundick filed
suit in federal court, claiming, among other things, that his expul-
sion deprived him of his liberty and property interests in his educa-
tion without due process of law.99 The court ultimately dismissed
Bundick's claim that the district's disciplinary actions violated his
substantive due process rights.
00
In its opinion, the court first noted that federal courts are "ex-
tremely, and quite properly, hesitant to become involved in the
public schools' disciplinary decisions."'' The court believed that
for a school administrator's conduct to violate substantive due
process, it must "be so offensive that it does not comport with tra-
ditional 'decencies of civilized conduct."",10 2 The court's opinion,
written by Judge Froeschner, held that the school's actions were
not arbitrary, capricious, or irrational. Rather, the court held that
the school's actions were compatible with a legitimate state goal of
maintaining an atmosphere conducive to learning. 0 3 Froeschner
ultimately disagreed with the court's rationale in Seal, stating that
"with all due respect to the Seal majority, it seems Judge Suhr-
heinrich, in dissent, has a better understanding of the law in this
area. Scienter is not a requirement of the school district's policy,
and that policy is entitled to deference.' ' 4
Froeschner concluded by stating that "[iut could be hypothe-
sized that a school board could act in a manner so extreme as to
violate the substantive due process rights of a student, however
this is not that case."' 0 5 The court based its decision on the simple
fact that an illegal knife was found in Bundick's possession on
95 Id. at 738.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 739-40.
99 Id. at 739.
100 Id. at 741.
i0l Id. at 740.
102 Id. (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998)).
103 Id. (quoting Jefferson v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F. 2d 303, 305-06 (5th Cir.
1987)).
104 Id.
105 Id. at 741.
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school grounds, 0 6 which violated the Texas Education Code provi-
sion that a student shall be expelled for possessing an illegal
knife. 1O
III. FEDERAL COURTS AND SCHOOL DISCIPLINARY DECISIONS
Federal courts, in general, have been reluctant to interfere
with the operation of public schools. 0 8 The Supreme Court ini-
tially concluded in Epperson v. Arkansas'09 that "[j]udicial inter-
position in the operation of the public school system of the Nation
raises problems requiring care and restraint .... By and large, pub-
lic education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and
local authorities." '" 0 Though the Court in Epperson in fact struck
down a state education law, it implied that such intrusion was to be
the exception not the rule."'
The Supreme Court later concluded in Wood v. Strickland"
2
that it is not "the role of the federal courts to set aside decisions of
school administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis
in wisdom or compassion."'"1 3 The students involved in Wood
claimed that their constitutional rights to due process were violated
when they were expelled from school for alcohol possession at
school activities." 4 The Court concluded that federal courts' cor-
rection of mistakes by school officials should be limited."
5
Later decisions by appellate courts have continued to express
concern about federal judicial intrusion into state school admini-
stration. In Rosa R. v. Connelly,"6 the Second Circuit held that in
school discipline cases, a substantive due process claim "would
only be available in a rare case where there was no 'rational rela-
tionship between the punishment and the offense."' ' t 7
The most recent appellate decision concerning a federal
court's interference with public school governance is the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Dunn v. Fairfield Community High School
106 Id.
107 TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.007(a)(l)(B) (Vernon 2002).
108 See, e.g., Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567,582 (6th Cir. 2000) (Suhrheinrich, J., dissent-
ing).
log 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
110 Id. at 104.
IH Id. at 105-06.
112 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
113 Id. at 326.
114 Id. at 308.
115 Id. at 308-09.
116 889 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1989).
117 Id. at 439 (quoting Brewer v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 779 F.2d 260, 264 (5th Cir.
1985)).
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District No. 225. 18 There, the court expressed concern about the
prospect of allowing substantive due process to "transform[] the
federal courts into an appellate arm of the schools throughout the
country."' 19 This case involved a suit by two high school students
who were given failing grades in their music class for deliberately
playing unauthorized guitar pieces at a band concert, which af-
fected one student's ability to graduate with honors. 20 The court
thought, much as in Ratner, that the board's decision may have
been an overreaction, but that there was no constitutional issue.1 21
Thus, there seems to be clear precedent that federal courts be-
come involved in school discipline cases only in rare circum-
stances. The question that Seal essentially wrestled with was
whether the lack of scienter in zero tolerance policies is so egre-
gious as to justify such interference. 122 The suspension or expul-
sion of a student from school for allegedly possessing contraband
that has been forbidden by the school's zero tolerance policy, even
though the student was unaware of possessing such contraband,
seems egregious and should even shock the conscience of the
court. Federal courts then are able to justify their entrance into
this area of school policy because there is essentially no rational
basis for punishing someone who may have never realized that he
possessed a weapon.
Proponents of zero tolerance policies argue that the safety of
children is a legitimate state interest, and that strict regulations
simply further that goal. 23 Ultimately, this cannot justify an outra-
geous zero tolerance policy. As the majority pointed out in Seal,
"the Board's Zero Tolerance Policy would surely be irrational if it
subjects to punishment students who did not knowingly or con-
sciously possess a weapon."' 124 In fact, "[t]o accept the Board's
argument [that federal courts should not interfere in this area]
would be to allow it to effectively insulate itself even from rational
basis review."' 25  Ultimately, federal courts should become in-
volved in school discipline cases if they believe that "a reasonable
trier of fact could conclude that [the student] was expelled for a
118 158 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 1998).
119 Id. at 966.
120 Id. at 962.
121 ld; see also Ratner v. Loudoun County Pub. Sch., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 16941, at *6
(4th Cir. 2001).
122 See Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 576-81 (6th Cir. 2000).
123 See Paul M. Bogos, "Expelled. No Excuses. No Exceptions." - Michigan's Zero-
Tolerance Policy in Response to School Violence: M.C.L.A. Section 380.1311, 74 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 357, 378-80 (1997).
124 Seal, 229 F.3d. at 578.
125 Id. at 579.
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reason that would have to be considered irrational. Most peo-
ple, presumably, agree that punishing a student who may have
never committed an offense is irrational. The hypothetical student
in Seal could easily be that innocent person. Subjecting him to
punishment, therefore, should be illegal.
The nature of some zero tolerance policies calls into question
whether there is any discretion on the part of school administrators
to alter the automatic suspension or expulsion of a student who has
violated such a school regulation. Such discretion may make these
policies less irrational and would save the policy from judicial in-
validation. The policies that were in place in Knox County, Ten-
nessee, and Loudoun County, Virginia, did allow the school board
some discretion to decide the severity of the punishment alto-
gether, but still did not allow discretion to eliminate punishment
itself. In Ratner, the court accepted the plaintiff's assertion as
true, that the policy in Loudoun County lacked a scienter require-
ment and thus mandated expulsion for weapons possession. The
court stated, "Although we accept Ratner's assertion as true for the
purposes of this appeal, we note that his brief's recitation of the
school's policies indicates that possession of a weapon on school
grounds would not necessarily result in long term suspension."
The court continued, stating that "board policy in such cases ap-
parently begins with a presumption that offending students will be
expelled (permanently removed) but allows school officials discre-
tion to subject offending students 'to such lesser disciplinary ac-
tion.' ' 127 A similar modification provision existed in the Seal
school district. According to Knox County school policy, "The
Superintendent may modify the length of the explusion [sic] or he
may uphold the recommendation of the principal for explusion
[sic] for a calendar year." 128
These zero tolerance policies at issue in Ratner and Seal as-
sume that the student was guilty of a violation (by possessing a
knife or other contraband) until proven innocent of a lesser of-
fense. Such a policy, on its face, does not seem as egregious as a
strict zero tolerance policy where there is absolutely no discretion
on the part of the school board. The dissent in Seal argued that
this policy "affords the student an opportunity to rebut the pre-
sumption of scienter, thereby guaranteeing that the zero tolerance
126 Id.
127 Ratner v. Loudoun County Pub. Sch., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 16941, at *4 n.2 (4th Cir.
2001).
128 KNox COUNTY BD. OF EDUC., KNOX COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION ZERO TOLER-
ANCE EXPULSIONS POLICY (issued Sept. 1, 2000), available at http://www.kcs.k12tn.net/hand
book/j/jccc2.html.
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policy is reasonably applied." 129 What the dissent in Seal fails to
take into consideration is that scienter is still lacking. A student,
like Ratner, can be caught with a knife on school grounds and, af-
ter he is given his procedural due process right to a hearing, can be
automatically expelled, or the board of education has the option to
automatically suspend him for the rest of the school year. Either
way, the school board automatically disciplines this student with-
out determining whether he intended to violate the school policy.
The possible reduction in punishment really only softens the blow
of zero tolerance policies that are unfairly applied in many circum-
stances.
Thus, the ability of the federal court to intervene may be justi-
fied. In addition to lacking wisdom and compassion, the applica-
tion of zero tolerance policies illustrate the rare case where school
boards cannot provide a rational relationship between the punish-
ment and the offense committed. Though federal courts should be
worried about allowing substantive due process claims to trans-
form these courts into an appellate arm of schools, zero tolerance
policies are serious regulations whose constitutionality should be
decided by federal courts.
IV. SCIENTER AND SCHOOL DISCIPLINE
A. The Need for Mens Rea in Criminal Statutes
As the majority in Seal stated, many criminal statutes do not
contain an intent requirement. 130 Legislatures can create offenses
not requiring scienter in some circumstances when it is necessary
to do so in the public interest.' 3' Further, many states and the
Model Penal Code provide that a defendant who is "willfully
blind" regarding a material fact possesses the equivalent of knowl-
edge of the fact.132 For example, federal judges give juries the so-
called "ostrich instruction," which informs the jury that "[n]o per-
son can intentionally avoid knowledge by closing his or her eyes to
facts which should prompt him or her to investigate."'' 33
The Supreme Court's guidance regarding the need for mens
rea is relatively clear, but its implications in the realm of zero tol-
129 Seal, 229 F.3d at 585 (Suhrheinrich, J. dissenting).
130 Seal, 229 F.3d at 577.
131 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 32 (2002).
132 United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184, 189 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[A] person with a lurking
suspicion goes on as before and avoids further knowledge, this may support an inference that he
has deduced the truth and is simply trying to avoid giving the appearance (and incurring the
consequences) of knowledge."); Model Penal Code § 2.02 (2) (2000).
133 Ramsey, 785 F.2d at 189.
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erance regulation is not. The Court in Staples v. United States
134
held that the absence of a mens rea requirement in a statue does
not necessarily suggest that the legislature intended to dispense
with it and that the court must construe the statute in light of back-
ground rules of common law in which some type of mens rea is
generally required. 35 Staples also provided the groundwork for
whether the crime in a particular statute should be considered a
public welfare offense, where no mens rea would be required.
Such an offense involves "dangerous and deleterious devices that
will be assumed to alert an individual that he stands in 'responsible
relation to a public danger."",136 Courts have interpreted threats to
public health and safety sufficient in themselves "to place the de-
fendant on notice of the likelihood of regulation and thus to excuse
the need to prove mens rea.
137
Proponents of zero tolerance policies argue that the Gun-Free
Schools Act' 38 was adopted to serve the public interest and wel-
fare. As most Americans already know, school violence has
reached alarming levels. During the 1997-98 school year, forty
students were killed on school property. 39 No one will ever forget
the tragic events at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado,
where two armed students invaded their school with automatic
weapons.14° The creation of a strict zero tolerance policy may
serve the public welfare. Admittedly, attending public school has
become dangerous. Students have to pass through metal detectors
and other means of detection more than ever in order to gain en-
trance to school. Zero tolerance policies, presumably, aid in the
protection of students and faculty and could possibly serve the
public welfare. Thus, they would not be subject to the traditional
need for mens rea.
Generally, though, public.welfare offenses have "been crimes
punishable by relatively light penalties such as fines or short jail
sentences, rather than substantial terms of imprisonment."'
14 1
Courts have interpreted public health and safety offenses as those
where the penalties are small and do not do grave harm to the of-
134 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
135 Id. at 618.
136 Id. at 613.
137 United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 263 (4th Cir. 1997).
138 20 U.S.C. § 8921 (2000) (repealed 2002).
139 See Erin Kelly, School Safest Place for Kids Despite Violence, Study Finds, CINCIN-
NATI ENQUIRER, July 29, 1998, at A10.
140 Matt Bai, Death at Columbine High, Anatomy of a Massacre, NEWSWEEK, May 3,
1999. at 22.
141 United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 391 (5th Cir. 1996).
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fender's reputation. 42 Thus, when the penalties for an offense are
small, the traditional mens rea requirement can be dispensed with.
Whether the penalties are small in school suspension cases is diffi-
cult to determine. A light suspension may not be considered a se-
vere penalty, but many times the use of zero tolerance is used to
expel students permanently or for a substantial time. While some
students will be sent to alternative educational institutions and oth-
ers will attend private schools, there is the chance that expulsion
from school will end that student's educational career. Expulsion
from school then may be considered a severe penalty. Even a brief
suspension from school would likely end up in a student's perma-
nent record. This blemish on a student's file could affect his
chances at gaining admission to college and have other devastating
effects. Thus, analyzing these policies under the criminal law, a
zero tolerance policy lacking scienter, which substantially harms
or punishes a student, would not be considered a public welfare
offense and would be unconstitutional.
In addition to the Supreme Court's guidance on strict liability
crimes and public welfare offenses, other courts list factors to be
considered in determining whether a statute sets forth a strict li-
ability crime in the first place.143 Though the absence of a mens
rea element seems clear in the zero tolerance policies found in
many school districts,' 44 including the policies that existed in Knox
and Loudoun Counties, looking at the factors to be considered
when such a statute is ambiguous is helpful in analyzing the con-
stitutionality of zero tolerance policies in general. Courts usually
look at the number of prosecutions expected, the seriousness of the
harm to the public that the statute seeks to prevent, whether the
crime is one for which it would be difficult and time consuming
for the prosecution to prove fault, and the extent to which a strict
liability crime would encompass innocent conduct. 145
The lack of scienter in zero tolerance policies probably will
not be justified under this approach. First, logically speaking, the
number of students who are disciplined every day in America's
schools far exceeds the number of criminal prosecutions. The
court in Seal mentioned the problems that would exist if students
142 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 29 F.3d 270, 272-73 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming defen-
dant's conviction for violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act because she had knowingly
possessed bald eagle feathers).
'41 See, e.g., State v. Ungerer, 621 N.E.2d 893 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (discussing the impor-
tance of strict liability offenses in the operation of a motor vehicle and not allowing a defendant
to plead not guilty by virtue of insanity); see also United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th
Cir. 1997) (finding that mens rea was required for a violation of the Clean Water Act).
144 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-4216 (2002).
145 State v. Semakula, 946 P.2d 795 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
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were allowed to litigate in federal court every time they were dis-
ciplined at school. 146 Though the number of expulsion cases may
be limited in relation to ordinary school discipline, the ability of
schools to prosecute each expulsion would be more difficult with-
out zero tolerance policies. However, criminal justice, in general,
would be easier if all offenses were strict liability; therefore, this
factor is not determinative.
Second, zero tolerance policies do relieve the prosecution of
time-consuming and difficult-to-prove cases. It would likely take
more time and energy, on the behalf of school administrators in-
vestigating school misconduct, to give students more rights when
they are faced with suspension or expulsion. In addition, in school
discipline cases, proof of fault is difficult. Every day, principals
have to ask, "Who started the fight?" and have to investigate viola-
tions of school policy. Zero tolerance policies that lack scienter do
ease the problems that are associated with running a public school,
yet the suspension of students' constitutional rights in order to
make teachers' and administrators' jobs easier is not likely to
make this factor determinative either.
Third, serious harm to the public exists if schools become
dangerous places to learn. Not only is the safety of students and
faculty in jeopardy, but the maintenance of a safe and effective
school system also affects the economic stability of property val-
ues within the school district. 47 A safe and effective school sys-
tem increases property values, while a downtrodden school system
decreases home values in a particular district.148 After all, schools
educate individuals who will eventually be leaders in their own
communities. The safe and efficient operation of public schools,
through the use of zero tolerance policies, may arguably help to
make schools safer.
The last factor is most relevant to zero tolerance policies.
Though these regulations seem to satisfy the prior factors, the last,
and arguably most important one, is that zero tolerance policies
that do not consider the intent of the student encompass a great
deal of innocent conduct. For example, in Lyons v. Penn Hills
School District,149 a seventh grade student was expelled for having
146 Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2000).
147 See Press Release, Yes on Proposition 26 Press Center (Feb. 22, 2000), available at
http://www.letsfixourschools.org/presscenter/pr_022800_sandiego.html ("As realtors, we know
quality schools attract stable caring families to neighborhoods and enhance the value of our
homes" (quoting William Johnson, President of the San Diego Association of Realtors)).
148 USC LUSK CENTER, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE SUMMIT REPORT 3 (Sept.
13, 2001), available at http://www.usc.edu/lusk.
149 723 A.2d 1073 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999).
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a Swiss Army knife in school. An eight-year-old girl in Louisiana
was expelled from the second grade for bringing her grandfather's
pocket watch which contained a small knife on the fob to show and
tell, 150 and in Virginia, a high school student was given a ten-day
suspension for taking a sip of mouthwash in class. The mouth-
wash contained alcohol, which violated the school's zero tolerance
policy. 5' Of course, the encompassment of such innocent behav-
ior has led to the backlash against these policies. Undoubtedly this
is because their imposition can often be cruel and unfair, as in Rat-
ner. It seems absurd to punish a boy like Ratner, who arguably
saved his friend's life by taking away the knife that she said she
was going to kill herself with, just as it is absurd to suspend a stu-
dent for taking a sip of mouthwash. It is counterproductive to dis-
courage decency and heroism in the name of a zero tolerance pol-
icy that seemingly aims to protect students.
Ultimately, considering the factors that courts look at when
determining whether a mens rea element is absent, and considering
the requirements in Staples regarding strict liability offenses, 52
zero tolerance would be unconstitutional under the criminal law.
Zero tolerance policies lacking scienter do not fit within the public
welfare exception to mens rea because of the sometimes-harsh
penalties associated with their imposition. Further, these policies
do not fulfill the general requirements that courts look to when
deciding if a statute sets forth a strict liability crime because they
encompass very innocent conduct like taking a sip of mouthwash
in class, or bringing a Swiss Army knife to school.
B. When Strict Liability Is Constitutional
Courts do suspend the mens rea requirement for other crimes
that are not considered public welfare offenses. These crimes im-
pose severe penalties, including long terms of imprisonment. Gen-
erally, in statutory rape cases, correctional facility discipline cases,
and automatic weapons possession cases, courts will not look at
scienter. These cases, though, are very different from and serve
different purposes than zero tolerance legislation. In United States
v. Cordoba-Hincapie,53 the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York reviewed the history and imposition
of strict liability crimes in an extremely detailed opinion. The
150 See Jessica Portner, Zero Tolerance Laws Getting a Second Look, EDUC. WK., Mar. 26,
1997, at 14.
151 Id. at 10.
152 See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
153 825 F. Supp. 485 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
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defendants in the case were charged with intentionally importing
heroin into the United States.' 54 Judge Weinstein began the opin-
ion by detailing the types of crimes that have historically not in-
cluded a mens rea element. First were public welfare offenses,
such as "minor violations of the liquor laws, the pure food laws,
the anti-narcotics laws, motor vehicle and traffic regulations, sani-
tary, building and factory laws and the like."'' 55 The court then
discussed the other forms of strict liability, stating that "[tihe most
widely recognized form of strict liability outside the realm of pub-
lic-welfare offenses probably is the doctrine, embodied in statute
and upheld by courts in a majority of states, that the perpetrator of
the crime of 'statutory rape' [is subject to strict liability]." 56
Numerous state cases discuss statutory rape. 157 A recent case
from the Utah Court of Appeals 58 upheld a law making consensual
sex with a minor a strict liability offense, stating that the law ra-
tionally furthered the legitimate governmental activity of protect-
ing children from sexual abuse. 159 Rejecting the nineteen-year-old
defendant's attempt to introduce evidence that he was reasonably
mistaken as to the age of the victim, the court concluded: "This
statutory scheme reflects our legislature's careful consideration of
the level of protection required for minors of different ages ....
[T]he statute rationally furthers a legitimate governmental inter-
est." The court went on to state, "It protects children from sexual
abuse by placing the risk of mistake as to a child's age on an older,
more mature person who chooses to engage in sexual activity with
one who may be young enough to fall within the statute's pur-
view." 160 The court's rationale regarding the need for a strict li-
ability statutory rape law in Utah is based upon the similar premise
that the dissent argued for in Seal, the protection of children. The
Seal dissent reached this conclusion based upon increasing vio-
lence in America's schools and the need to protect children from
that violence.
t6
'
Though zero tolerance policies arguably protect children from
violence by making schools safer, it seems equally likely or more
154 Id. at 488.
155 Id. at 496.
156 Id. at 497.
157 See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 438 P.2d 228 (Alaska 1968) (affirming an indictment upon
two counts of statutory rape and two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor);
People v. Osband, 919 P.2d 640 (Cal. 1996) (discussing victim's testimony that she believed
defendant was accused of statutory rape).
158 State v. Martinez, 14 P.3d 114 (Utah Ct. App. 2000).
159 Id. at 120.
160 Id. at 119-20.
161 Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 582-83 (6th Cir. 2000).
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plausible to argue that these policies harm children due to abuses
by school administrators through unequal and harsh imposition.
Further, it seems difficult to see how strict liability zero tolerance
policies protect children the way that statutory rape laws protect
young children from the sexual exploitation of adults. The tradi-
tional rationale for statutory rape as a strict liability offense has to
do with the long-term psychological and physical effects that are
likely to befall the victim.' 62 It is not clear that similar harms can
be expected from students bringing alcoholic mouthwash to class
or students engaging in other innocent behavior. Such behavior is
not as serious or as damaging to society as the crime of statutory
rape because of the psychological and physical effects of that
crime, namely pregnancy and disease.In another statutory rape case, United States v. Ransom,163 the
defendant was charged with having sexual intercourse with a girl
under the age of twelve. The court in this opinion reasoned that in
order to show that a strict liability statute was inconsistent with
due process, the defendant "must demonstrate that the practice
adopted by the legislature 'offends some principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental. '"" 64 The court then mentioned that the his-
tory of the offense of statutory rape indicates that from ancient
times the law has afforded special protection to those deemed too
young to understand the consequences of their actions. 165 Statu-
tory rape, as an exception to the mens rea requirement, is needed
to protect innocent children from sexual exploitation. It does not
follow that the same protection is needed for children attending
public schools to be free from the effects of violence. Guards and
other security devices can be used in school districts with severe
problems. Further, as the Ransom court noted, statutory rape has a
long tradition of being an exception to the traditional mens rea re-
quirement. Zero tolerance policies, on the other hand, are recent
policy decisions that lack such a fundamental tradition.
Another area of the law, where scienter is not required, is the
governance of correctional facilities. People v. Ramsdell166 held
that possession of contraband by a prisoner is a strict liability
crime and accordingly, the trial court refused to allow the defen-
dant to present evidence to support theories that he did not know
162 See Michael M. v. Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 468-71 (1981) (stating that preventing
teenage pregnancy was the primary aim of the legislation).
163 '942 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1991).
164 Id. at 777 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934)).
165 Id.
'66 585 N.W.2d I (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
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that a package contained drugs and that he possessed the package
under duress.' 67 In that case, a corrections officer at the prison
testified that he saw the defendant in his cell cutting up small,
white pieces of paper into one to two inch squares. 168 The guard
explained that in his experience as a correctional officer, such
small squares of paper were used to package cocaine. After a
search of the prisoner's cell and a subsequent lab examination of
the drugs seized, they tested positive as marijuana.1 69
The Michigan statute in question provides that "a prisoner
shall not possess any alcoholic liquor, prescription drug, poison, or
controlled substance."'' 70 The court concluded that in enacting the
statute, the legislature straightforwardly set out two, and only two,
elements of the crime: a prosecutor must prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that the defendant is in a fact a prisoner and that the
defendant possessed a controlled substance.' 7' Believing that
"there is a straightforward reason, requiring no great amount of
thought or interpretation, for imposing a different, and stricter,
standard on prisoners than on the general population,"' 72 the court
explained that prisoners are:
after all, convicted criminals whose liberty is restricted by
law and who are confined, after all, in the controlled, but of-
ten volatile, environment of a state prison. To require a
knowing possession of drugs as an element of the crime for
the general populace while omitting such a requirement for
prisoners is, when viewed in this context, indeed sensible.1 73
The Michigan legislature's creation of a strict liability offense
for contraband possession and the court's rationale for such a law
seem plausible. After all, these are prisoners confined in a correc-
tional facility who have committed crimes and who have had their
liberty taken away from them. In order to effectively govern cor-
rectional facilities, the mens rea exception seems necessary. In
school discipline cases, however, the mens rea exception does not
make sense. Schools have not become the "often volatile envi-
ronment" that prisons are. Though some school districts undoubt-
edly have serious problems with maintaining security of the stu-
167 Id. at 5. Also note that in the governance of federal prisons, strict liability for posses-
sion of contraband exists as well. United States v. Holt, 79 F.3d 14 (4th Cir. 1996).
168 Ramsdell, 585 N.w.2d at 3.
169 Id.
170 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 800.281(4) (West 2000).
171 Ramsdell, 585 N.W.2d at 4.
172 Id. at 5.
173 Id.
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dent body, many districts do not. By imposing the same types of
regulations upon school children as exist in prisons, the "vigilant
protection of constitutional freedoms . . . in the community of
American Schools"' 174 is lost. Ultimately, the mens rea exceptions
found in the Seal, Ratner, and Bundick school districts do not seem
as necessary as the Ramsdell exception for prisoner possession of
contraband. Of course, the fact that the strict liability exception to
mens rea in schools is not as needed as it is in dangerous prisons
does not mean that zero tolerance policies are unconstitutional.
One only has to use common sense, though, to see that students are
being subjected to arbitrary rules without regard to circumstances.
Society should not tolerate eliminating the intent of students in the
imposition of zero tolerance policies in the same way as society
tolerates the elimination of mens rea in the governance of Amer-
ica's prison population.
Courts have also upheld strict liability statutes banning the
possession of automatic weapons, in essence, because of their in-
trinsic danger. 75 At oral argument in Seal, the board of education
presented the case of Peoples Rights Organization v. City of Co-
lumbus176 to support its contention that the Sixth Circuit has found
exceptions to the mens rea requirement in some areas of weapons
possession. Presumably, this case was introduced to justify the
imposition of strict liability for Seal's possession of a knife.
Though the court did conclude that a city ordinance could impose
strict liability for assault weapons possession, the Seal court be-
lieved that the case did not support the Board's position.'
77
The Seal majority explained that strict liability, in the context
of a weapons possession statute
at most means that the government would not need to prove
that the defendant knew he was violating the law, or that the
weapon possessed the attributes that make it a specific type
of weapon - an assault weapon or machine gun, for example
- that is likely the subject of heavy regulation or prohibi-
tion."178
The court concluded that nothing in the case "even remotely sug-
gests that a defendant can be convicted for the unknowing posses-
sion of an item that is later revealed to be a statutory 'assault
'74 See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,487 (1960).
175 See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (discussed in more detail at
supra notes 134-46 and accompanying text).
176 152 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 1998).
177 See id. at 534-35; see also Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 577 (6th Cir. 2000).
171 Seal, 229 F.3d at 577.
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weapon. ' '' 79 Thus, though strict liability for assault weapons pos-
session is not unconstitutional, the prosecution would still need to
prove that the defendant intended to possess a weapon in the first
place.
Applying this ruling to zero tolerance policies, the school dis-
trict would still need to prove that the student intended to possess a
knife in the first place. Though intent may be inferred from the
student's possession of the knife in Seal, Ratner, or Bundick, some
sort of hearing would need to be held to determine whether such an
inference has any justification. If a logical inference could be de-
termined, then possibly these students could have been suspended
or expelled. It was the automatic presumption of guilt applied in
each of these three cases that violated the student's substantive due
process rights, since the zero tolerance policies that existed never
required the school authorities to determine whether the student
actually intended to possess the weapon in question. Such proof
should be required in America's public schools. This type of in-
quiry would allow school administrators to determine whether a
student accidentally left the contraband in his truck or whether he
intended to bring it to school.
Thus, though there are exceptions in criminal law to the tradi-
tional need for mens rea, each exception is not applicable in the
context of school zero tolerance policies. Zero tolerance policies
cannot fit within the mens rea exceptions found in public welfare
laws. There, the infractions result in fines or other light punish-
ment. As illustrated, the expulsion from school represents a seri-
ous punishment that could end a student's educational career. In
addition to public welfare cases, other strict liability crimes have
been found to be constitutional where punishment can be severe:
in statutory rape cases, correctional facility cases, and automatic
weapons possession cases, the law has carved out unique excep-
tions to the need for mens rea. Zero tolerance policies, however,
do not fit within any of these exceptions. Zero tolerance lacks the
long-standing tradition and purpose that statutory rape possesses; it
lacks the necessity of correctional facility strict liability; and it is
ultimately not the same as strict liability for assault weapons pos-
session because the intent to carry a weapon is still needed in such
cases. Such intent is never needed in zero tolerance policies that
lack scienter.
179 Id.
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C. The Resurgence of Mens Rea
Almost fifty years ago, the Supreme Court in Morrissette v.
United States180 declared that "an injury can amount to a crime
only when inflicted by intention. [This] is no provincial or tran-
sient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of
law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent abil-
ity .. .to chose between good and evil."' 8 In fact, most modern
scholars reject the concept of strict liability, believing that punish-
ing conduct without reference to the actor's state of mind fails to
reach the desired end and is unjust. 82 Many commentators believe
that "conduct unaccompanied by an awareness of the factors mak-
ing it criminal does not mark the actor as one who needs to be sub-
jected to punishment in order to deter him or others from behaving
similarly in the future, nor does it single him out as [being] so-
cially dangerous."
'' 83
Others contend that the essential facet of liability is blame-
worthiness. On this view "the predicate for all criminal liability is
blameworthiness; it is the social stigma which a finding of guilt
carries that distinguishes the criminal [penalty] from all other
sanctions. If the predicate is removed, the criminal law is set
adrift." 184 In fact, the Model Penal Code generally requires some
kind of culpability, requiring a purposeful, knowing, reckless, or
negligent state of mind.1 85 Though the Code does recognize strict
liability offenses, those offenses are defined as wrongs subject
only to a fine, forfeiture, or other civil penalty.
186
The hypothetical student who innocently drinks the spiked
punch at the school dance is not blameworthy. He has done noth-
ing wrong that should subject him to punishment. In addition,
punishing him will not deter anyone from committing the same act
in the future. Looking at Ratner, the student who saved his
friend's life was not blarheworthy. His punishment, though, will
deter future conduct. Unfortunately, it will deter students from
attempting to help a potentially suicidal student who is carrying a
knife and threatening to kill herself.
180 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
181 Id. at 250.
182 See Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 107, 109
(1962).
183 Id.
184 Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: III - The Rise and Fall of Strict
Criminal Liability, 30 B.C. L. REV. 337, 404-05 (1989).
185 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (2000).
186 Id. at §§ 1.04, 2.05.
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In addition, the criminal law, as expressed in the Model Penal
Code and in the opinions of scholars, has tended to shy away from
the use of strict liability crimes because they do not satisfy the his-
toric rationales for punishment. Usually, punishment is imposed
because of general deterrence, individual deterrence, incapacita-
tion, and reform.187 Punishing a student who was unaware that he
was possessing contraband that was prohibited by a zero tolerance
policy will not deter the general student body nor will it deter that
student. Of course, you cannot deter a student from drinking the
spiked punch at a school dance if the student does not know that
the punch was spiked. Presumably, zero tolerance policies will
incapacitate that student from coming to school, but this will not
''prevent persons of dangerous disposition from acting upon their
destructive tendencies."'' 88 After all, the student kept from school
could have been the valedictorian who had the knife planted in his
backpack. The imposition of zero tolerance will not reform this
student because he may not have known that he committed a viola-
tion. How can you reform someone who may have done nothing
wrong in the first place? It is no wonder that the Model Penal
Code and many scholars reject the imposition of strict liability.
The problem with such liability is no more evident than in zero
tolerance legislation.
D. The Unconstitutionality of Non-Criminal Strict Liability Offenses
The strict liability exceptions discussed at length have been
exceptions to the criminal law. School discipline cases, of course,
are not criminal matters. However, the majority in Seal argued
that the legality of zero tolerance policies that lack a scienter re-
quirement should be analyzed under this criminal framework. 89
Other courts have struck down such policies as unconstitutional in
areas of the law where the affected party had a property interest
only, and was not subjected to criminal penalties.
A recent case from the Ninth Circuit struck down a Housing
and Urban Development ("HUD") policy that created a "One
Strike and You're Out" rule for residents in HUD housing for pos-
187 4 KENT GREENAWALT, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1340-41 (Sanford H.
Kadish ed., 1983). General deterrence presumes that knowledge that punishment will follow a
crime deters people from committing crimes in the first place. Individual deterrence means that
the actual imposition of punishment creates fear in the offender that if he repeats his acts, he
will be punished again. Reform states that punishment will help to reform the criminal so that
his wish to commit crimes will be lessened. Incapacitation means that imprisonment puts con-
victed criminals out of the general population. Id.
188 Id. at 1341.
189 See Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 576-77 (6th Cir. 2000).
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session of drugs on or around these housing facilities.' 90 Though
the decision was reversed by the Supreme Court,' 91 the appellate
court's arguments and the Supreme Court opinion shed light on the
constitutionality of zero tolerance policies. The appellate court
refused to accept HUD's interpretation of a statute that failed to
investigate the scienter of the tenant who possessed drugs. In fact,
the court stated: "[W]e need look no further than the facts of this
case for an example of the odd and unjust results that arise under
HUD's interpretation."' 92 The statute in question states:
To assure that the tenant, any member of the household, a
guest, or another person under the tenant's control, shall not
engage in:
(A) Any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety,
or right to peaceful enjoyment of the PHA's [Public Housing
Authority] public housing premises by other residents or em-
ployees of the PHA, or
(B) Any drug-related criminal activity on or near such
premises.
Any criminal activity in violation of the preceding sentence
shall be cause for termination of tenancy, and for eviction
from the unit.'
93
When these regulations were issued, HUD gave the local pub-
lic housing authorities authority to evict a tenant whose household
members or guests were involved in drug activity, whether the ten-
ant knew or should have known of the activity or tried to prevent
the activity. 94 In fact, in 1996, President Clinton announced the
"One Strike and You're Out" policy and tied federal funding to
increased evictions regardless of the circumstances.'
95
The facts of the case clearly make the resulting eviction odd
and unjust. Pearlie Rucker, a sixty-three-year-old woman, lived
190 See Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2001) rev'd by 122 S.Ct.
1230(2002).
191 Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 122 S. Ct. 1230 (2002).
192 Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1124.
193 Id. at 1116 (citing 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(f)(12)(i) (2002)).
194 See 56 Fed. Reg. 51,560, 51,567 (Oct. 11, 1991) (to be codified at 4 C.F.R. pt. 966)
("The tenant should not be excused from contractual responsibility by arguing that the tenant
did not know, could not foresee, or could not control behavior by other occupants of the unit.").
195 See John F. Harris, Clinton Links Housing Aid to Eviction of Crime Suspects; Civil
Libertarians Attack 'One Strike' Policy That Affects Defendants Not Yet Convicted, WASH.
POST, Mar. 29, 1996, at A.
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with her mentally disabled daughter and her two grandchildren in
an Oakland Housing Authority ("OHA") complex in Oakland,
California. The OHA sought to evict Rucker because her daughter
was found in possession of cocaine three blocks from the apart-
ment. 196 Rucker asserted that she regularly searched her daugh-
ter's room for evidence of alcohol or drug use and had never found
any evidence of such use. Three other tenants were also evicted
for similar reasons and sought a preliminary injunction enjoining
the unlawful detainer actions against them and against enforcement
of HUD's regulation and the corresponding provision in the OHA
lease. 197
One of the reasons the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that that this statute was unconstitutional was
because of the absurd result: "It is well established that we will not
assume Congress intended an odd or absurd result."1 98 Looking at
the case at hand, the court stated that "HUD conceded at oral ar-
gument that there was nothing more Pearlie Rucker could have
done to protect herself from eviction, but argued that the statute
authorized her eviction nonetheless."'' 99 In fact, HUD took the po-
sition that "the statute would apply and permit eviction of an entire
family if a tenant's child was visiting friends on the other side of
the country and was caught smoking marijuana, even if the parents
had no idea the child had ever engaged in such activity. '' 2°
The court stated, "Penalizing conduct that involves no inten-
tional wrongdoing by an individual can run afoul of the Due Proc-
ess Clause.'2° Its reasoning was that public housing tenants have
a property interest in their tenancy, 202 and that HUD's strict liabil-
ity interpretation of the statute would permit tenants to be deprived
of their property interest without any relationship to individual
wrongdoing.2 °3
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the opinion of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, stating that
HUD was not trying to criminally punish members of the public,
but was instead acting as a landlord, "invoking a clause in a lease
196 Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1117.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 1124 (citing United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 69-70 (1994);
Pub. Citizen v. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 453-55 (1989)).
199 Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1124.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 1124 (citing Scales v. United States., 367 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1961)).
202 See Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 450-51 (1982) (declining to resolve a constitu-
tional question based on whether an action is "more properly characterized as one in rem or in
personam").
203 Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1125.
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to which respondents have agreed and which Congress has ex-
pressly required., 20 4 Further, the Court held that the statute does
not lead to absurd results because the statute does not require the
eviction of any tenant who violates the lease provision. Instead, it
"entrusts that decision to the local public housing authorities, who
are in the best position to take account" of the level of drug or
crime activity.2 °5 It is unclear whether the Court is stating that
zero tolerance, in general, is constitutionally permissible if the lo-
cal authority imposing such a policy has the discretion to sanction
- meaning that it is constitutional for a local school district or
housing authority to implement a zero tolerance policy if that au-
thority is provided discretion to use it. Such a result seems less
egregious, yet still imposes punishment without regard to fault.
E. Balancing the Safety of Schools with Students' Constitutional
Rights
Most people would agree that the function of public schools
should be to educate students. In order to do this, schools need to
teach children to be responsible members of society. Yet, schools
also need to be safe places to learn. In order to balance the two
competing interests, a fine line needs to be drawn between stu-
dents' due process rights and the safety of the schools that they
attend.
As the concurring opinion in Ratner stated, "There is no doubt
that this zero-tolerance/automatic suspension policy, and others
like it adopted by school officials throughout the nation, were
adopted in large response to the tragic school shootings that have
plagued our nation's schools over the past several years. 20 6 In
response to these events, school districts across the country needed
to respond. They needed to do something to assure the community
that their children were safe. Judge Hamilton continued in his Rat-
ner concurrence to state that "no doubt exists that in adopting
these [zero-tolerance] policies, school officials had the noble in-
tention of protecting the health and safety of our nation's school
children and those adults charged with the profound responsibility
of educating them., 20 7 Unfortunately, those best of intentions have
gone awry.
204 Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 122 S. Ct. 1230, 1236 (2002).
205 Id. at 1235.
206 Ratner v. Loudoun County Pub. Sch., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 16941, at *8 (4th Cir.
2001) (Hamilton, J., concurring).
207 Id. (Hamilton, J., concurring).
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Of course, the need to protect students is a serious concern of
educators and of the community. Yet, the protection of students'
constitutional rights is also important. Students should not and do
not possess all the rights that others who are not confined within
the schoolhouse gates possess. As the Bundick court noted, "The
Due Process Clause does not necessarily provide the right [of stu-
dents] to secure counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses supporting the charges, or the right to call witnesses in
one's defense. 2 °8  Of course, the need to protect students and
maintain discipline does not allow students to be assured all of the
guarantees that are afforded others. Students, though, should be
afforded basic substantive due process protections and, in the hys-
teria of school shootings, school districts have ignored these basic
protections in order to make sure that the school shootings that
have happened across the country will not happen in their schools.
Thus, the balance between these two competing interests has been
upset by zero tolerance policies that lack a scienter requirement.
CONCLUSION
Zero tolerance policies, which do not consider the intent of
the student, are not rationally related to any government interest.
Though the protection of children is a.seemingly viable interest,
the application of zero tolerance is not a rational way to achieve
every school district's goal of providing safe and effective schools.
These policies are not even reasonable because of the harm they.
sometimes cause innocent children. Though the Supreme Court
has clearly limited students' rights, it has not abandoned them.
In addition, although federal courts have been hesitant to in-
terfere in this area of state control, zero tolerance policies have
become a divisive issue. Further, courts that have decided these
issues agree that any school policy that is not rationally related or
that shocks the conscience of the court violates a student's consti-
tutional rights. Zero tolerance policies should shock the con-
science of the court because of their devastating effects upon inno-
cent students. In addition, these policies teach children that the
law is often unfair and unreasonable. These are not the types of
lessons that should be taught everyday in America's public
schools.
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